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It has been said that the primary objective of the
business firm is maximization of profit; however, basic
to this is the objective of survival. The business enter¬
prise is susceptible to many factors that may cause failure,
some of these factors are avoidable and some are unavoid¬
able, To survive, the business must possess a unique com¬
bination of competent management and luck. Since this is
a unique conibination, many businesses fail annually, Thie
problem of business failure has many facets. The follow¬
ing discussion will be an attaint to explore some of these
facets.
Brief review of failure trends.—Dun and Bradstreet,
Inc, has kept a continuous record of commercial and in¬
dustrial failures for the past 109 years. During this
period they have analyzed a total of 1,209,566 failures,^
To gain a better understanding of the problem of failure
it is necessary to review what has happened in the past.
Because Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. has the most comprehensive
^The Failure Record Through 196Ii. (New York: Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 1965), p, 2.
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records, the following discussion will make reference to
these records.
During the period 1920 to 196I4. the greatest number
of failures occurred in the three year period 1930 to 1933•
In this three year period a total of 66,i|.62 businesses
failed with total current liabilities of $2,332,805,000.
This period also contained the greatest failure rate per
10,000 listed concerns, 123, 133» and 154 respectively.
However, the average liability per failure has been in¬
creasing every period being highest in 19614.. In this year
the average liability per failure was $98,14.514..^ However
nearly 50 per cent of these failures had liabilities within
the 5j000 to 25,000 range.
Table 1 shows the distribution of business failures
by size of liability. Prom the table it is apparent that
the majority of the failures are small businesses. During
this period 85 per cent of the businesses that failed had
liabilities under $100,000.
Another aspect to consider is the age of business
failures. The typical failure is in its second or third
year of operation. Almost three-fifths of the failures are
less than five years old with the largest number of failures
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being at the two year level.
^Ibid.. p. 3.
p
Rowena Wyant, “Least Likely to Succeed,” Dun*a Review
and Modern Industry. LXX (November, 1937)» P* 31*
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OP BUSINESS FAILURES
BY SIZE OP LIABILITIES
Under | 5,000 to $ 25,000 to |100,000 to Over
15,000 25,000 100,000 1 Million 1 Million
Year No. j No. % No. %No. % No.^
i960 1,688 10.9 6,884 44,6 5,078 32.9 1,703 11.0 92 0.6
1961 1,903 11.1 7,378 43.2 5,725 33.5 1,973 11.6 96 0.6
1962 1,614-7 IO.I4. 6,700 42.5 5,425 34.14- 1,876 11.9 134 0.8
1963 1,296 9.0 5,781 40.2 5,115 35.6 2,031 14.1 151 1.1
196l^. 1,093 8.1 5,202 38.5 5,051 37.4 2,003 14.9 152 1.1
Source: The Failure Record Through 1961j. (New York: Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 1965), p. f.
k
Table 2 shows the distribution of business failures
by age for the period 1960-196l|.*
TABLE 2




$ Years or Less
% in Business
6 to 10 Years
% in Business
Over 10 Years
i960 ^8,6 20.8 20.6
1961 56,2 22.4 21,4
1962 55.4 22.2 22,4
1963 55.4 21,7 22.9
1964 56,0 21.5 22.5
Source: The Failure Record Through 196k (New York:
Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 196^), p, 11.
This table clearly indicates that the typical failure
occurs in the first five years.
Another important aspect of failure is its distribution
by industry. Over the years, retailers have made up $0 per
cent or more of the total failures.^ Table 3 shows conaner-
cial and industrial failures by divisions of industry. Al¬
though the largest nunber of failures are in the retail
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Mining and Manufacturing 2.2S4 361,846
Wholesale Trade 1,392 2k0,l(.92
Retail Trade 6,2kl 281,948
Construction 2,p8 262,392
Commercial Services 1,266 782,527
Source: The Failure Record Through 196Ii. (New York:
Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 196^p* 9*
Though presently the failure rate Is slowing, the lia¬
bilities per failure are continuing to rise.
Business failures, on the heels of their 30 per cent
Jump in March 1966 slowed 10 per cent in April to 1,106«
The dollar liabilities continued the upswing of the prior
months, rising 6 per cent to #110«1 million, the most sis
able volume in eight months and one-third larger than the
83*2 million in April last year*^
Generally the trends of the past are same as present
and will continue in the future.
Economic significance of business failures.—The rate
of business failures is a disturbing factor in any economy.
The failure of a business firm is a misfortune to several
groups of persons directly or indirectly interested in or
Monthly
1966), p, 2,
Failures (New York: Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.,
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affected by it. The business failure may mean a loss of
capital on the part of the owner or investors. The owner
or investor places funds in the business with the expecta¬
tion that these funds will increase in value and provide
them with an annual income. The business failure may mean
a loss of part of or all of these funds. The employees are
naturally interested because the business furnishes them
with jobs. The eu^iloyee desires steady employment and the
failure of a business may greatly affect his future. Even
before the failure the financial difficulties may mean lay¬
off or a slow payment of wages. Managerial employees are
particularly concerned with a business failure since they
are directly responsible for guiding the business to a
healthy and profitable future,^ This also means an in¬
crease in the nunfeer of persons unei^loyed* which causes
greater competition for jobs and may contribute to a de¬
cline in wage rates. The creditors are also affected by the
failure. They may lose all or part of their funds extended
to the business9 meaning the loss of customers. It may also
mean that the creditors’ funds will be tied up in lengthy
court proceedings, which could cause financial difficulties
for them.
The successful business contributes greatly to the
community. It provides the members of the community with
William H. Husband and James C, Dockeray, Modern
Corporation Finance (Homewood, Illinois: Richard !D, Irwin,
Inc., 19^7), p. h31.
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employment, which means income and prosperity for the commu¬
nity. The failure of a business means the elimination of a
firm supplying the community with goods and services tlaat it
wants and needs. The failure reduces the total sum of in-
vest&ble funds in the community and is a contributing factor
to business recession or deterrent to business expansion.
The failure of a business enterprise is considered a social
waste
The failure of a business also affects government.
Because the business enterprise is a taxpayer, contributing
to the support of local and national institutions and pro¬
jects, it means the loss of tax income. The loss of Income
tax, in any form, may cause the curtailment of services and
governmental projects or deficit financing. Neither of these
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outcomes are considered socially desirable.
Another economic aspect of business failures is that
they are low during times of prosperity and high during
depressions:
The number of business failures parallels closely
the trend of business conditions. In a period of ac¬
tivity, which Includes the stages of recovery and pros¬
perity in the business cycle, business failures decrease
in nuiiiber, while in a period of inactivity, which encom¬
passes the stages of relapse and depression, the number
increases .... Business prosperity depends upon the
relationship of prices, for the competent as for the in¬
competent, for the firm with plenty of capital as for the
M. Broom and J, G. Longnecker, Small Business




firm handicapped by a lack of capital. In a period of
activity, prices are advanced and profits are easily
secured. Under such conditions, the number of failures
naturally decrease. In a period of inactivity, prices
fall, and profits are accordingly difficult to obtain.
The nu^er of business failures increases as a conse¬
quence , , , ,^
The rate of business failures can contribute to in¬
creasing decline in economic activity and the increasing
decline in economic activity can contribute to the increasing
rate of business failures. During the early 1930*s business
failures became so prevalent that they were a problem of
national significance. Failures occurred on such a large
scale that standards of living were jeopardized. Unemploy¬
ment became so widespread that great segments of our popula¬
tion were unable to earn a living at private employment.
During this period the federal government had to take drastic
measures to rehabilitate the economy. The Home Owner's Loan
Corporation was organized to refinance distressed home owners
and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, now the Small
Business Administration, aided financial and business insti-
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tutlons. These and other organizations were formed to aid
the various segments of the economy.
Survey of the literature in the field,—The most com¬
prehensive study of business failure is made by Dun and
^Paul J, Fitzpatrick, Symptoms of Industrial Failures
(Washington, D, C,: The Catholic University of America,
1931), P. 10,
p
Husband and Dockeray, op,cit,, p, 632,
9
Bradstreet, Inc* Their publications on failure include
Business Failures, a weekly publication with comments and
analysis; Monthly Business Failures, with numbers and lia¬
bilities in 39 business lines; fluarterly Analysis of Fail¬
ures. a detailed breakdown of failures by line; and The
Failure Record, a comprehensive failure study by location.
Industry, age, size, and causes.^ Dun and Bradstreet has
kept a continuous record of commercial and industrial failures
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for 109 years. Dun and Bradstreet’s Industry Studies division
submit monthly reports on failure for publication in Dun’s Re¬
view and Modern Industry. Prom present evidence. Dun and Brad¬
street has never, to any significant extent, dealt with the
financial causes of business failures. The financial causes
of business failures are grouped as internal causes, but are
not elaborated on or stated specifically.
Possibly the only book on the subject of business fail¬
ures exclusively, is The Problem of Business Failures by Paul
J, Fitzpatrick written in 1936 of which there are evidently
very very few copies in circulation. However, most text on
corporate finance have a chapter on the subject. Some texts
discuss failure and reorganization in the same chapter, but
still provide basic information on the subject.
The Small Business Administration Research Grant Pro¬
gram of the Small Business Administration has sponsored many
^The Failure Record Through 196k (New York: Dun and
Bradstreet,Inc., 1965), p. l6,
%bid.
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studies on business failures. These studies were made by
various universities and are concerned chiefly with the
failure problem of certain industries in specific geographi¬
cal location, as the problem in a certain state. Unfort¬
unately, the conclusions drawn from these studies are not
applicable to business failures in general for the following
reasons:
(1) The problems suffered were characteristic of a
particular industry,
(2) The problems suffered were characteristic of a
particular geographic location,
(3) The personality of the owner played an important
part in the success or failure of the enterprise,^
However, these cases are very important to the small
business in the industry and in the area studied.
Other studies were made by the University of Illinois
and the Department of Commerce, The studies made by the
University of Illinois were made in the early 1930’s and
are very rare today. Victor Sadd and Robert Williams of
the Department of Commerce in conjunction with Yale Univer¬
sity studied the affairs and events leading to 570 commer¬
cial bankruptcies in Massachusetts between November 1930
^Small Business Administration, Management Research




Many articles on business failure are published each
year In various periodicals, however, many obtain their In¬
formation from the Dun and Bradstreet records.
Scope and limitations of the study.—The present study
Is not Intended to be an exhaustive study of the causes of
business failures. This study will analyze the financial
causes of business failures and discuss techniques used to
detect a deteriorating financial position. Factual cases
will be used to Illustrate the stages of failure and show
bpw the various financial difficulties contributed to the
ultimate failure. The specific financial causes of failure
are: excessive floating debt, excessive fixed charges, ex¬
cessive funded debt, slow collections, unwise dividend policy.
Inadequate provisions for maintenance and depreciation, over-
expansion and poor financial planning. The study will also
discuss ratios, comparative statements and other tools such
as the source and application of funds statements, pro forma
statements and cash flows as they can be used to detect a
deteriorating financial position. Here we will attempt to
Illustrate how these analytical tools and competent manage¬
ment can detect failure tendencies early enough to correct
or take measures to offset some of these devastating effects.
^Victor Sadd and Robert T, Williams, Causes of Commer¬
cial Bankruptcies. Domestic Commerce Series No, 69 (Washlng-
ton, D. C.: U. S, Government Printing Office, 1932), p, 2,
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Purpose of the study,—The purpose of the study is to
shed light on some of the aspects of business failure that
have received little attention thus far. It specifically
seeks to analyze the financial causes of business failures
and to discuss the methods used to detect a deteriorating
financial position. It is assumed that this study will be
helpful to those interested in businesses experiencing
financial difficulties. It is hoped that the present study
will equip the reader with information that can be helpful
and useful in formulating procedures and policies that may
prevent failure.
CHAPTER II
STAGES OF BUSINESS FAILURE
Failure is commonly referred to as the inability to
meet financial obligations. It is defined under bankruptcy
act as a state of insolvency ”when the aggregate of the pro¬
perty, ... shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in
amount to pay his debt,”^ Failure is commonly associated
with receivership and bankruptcy or some other form of legal
assistance. However, the term failure is much more technical
than this. The type of failure referred to in the Bankruptcy
Act is the legal aspect of failure, but there are two other
types or stages of failure that preceed the legal failure,
namely, economic and financial failure. Economic and finan¬
cial failure may have existed for some time finally culmi¬
nating in legal failure.
Failure may exist almost immediately upon the initial
organization of the enterprise, and may continue for years
before the business is actually placed in receivership or
forced into bankruptcy. Thus, the true concept of failure
is necessarily much broader in scope than commonly conceived,
^Jules I, Bogen, Financial Handbook (Third Edtion;
New York: The Ronald Press Co,, 1953)» p. 930,
13
The popular idea of failure too frequently confines itself
solely to the legal aspect of the problem. In order to in¬
telligently understand the failure problem it is necessary
to extend the definition and conception of failure to in¬
clude the economic and financial phases. Consequently, any
complete definition of business failure must cover the prob¬
lem in its three stages: (1) economic failure; (2) financial
failure; (3) legal failure.
Economic failure.—An economic failure does not require
the suspension of business activity, nor does it imply a loss
to creditors will be involved; neither does it mean the in¬
ability to meet debt payments at maturity or that capital
will be Impaired. A business is considered to be an economic
failure when the earnings are not commensurate with the de¬
gree of risk involved.^ A business enterprise may also be
considered an economic failure if it has not been able to
earn, in the owners opinion, a satisfactory return on the
investment.
This type of failure may be likened to the disease
of cancer; it represents a condition in which its ear¬
liest stages sows the seeds of ultimate difficulties.
Unless detected and corrected it leads to conditions
in which the corporation may later become a financial
failure and finally a confirmed legal failure.^
^W. Bayard Taylor, Financial Policies of Business En-
terprises (2nd. ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1956), p. 296.
^Louls P. Starkweather, ’’Why Business Failure,” Credit
and Financial Ifeinagement (May 19ij.l), p. 20.
A good ease in point is that of the Pairview Motors
Company.
In its early years, Pairview Motors, Inc. . . •
barely managed to survive the uncertain economic circum¬
stances following the severe depression of the early
thirties. In 1937 the company sold 127 cars at a profit
of $126,00. The recession of 1938 cut sales of new cars
back to 1^0, The owner of Pairview Motors, Inc., Mr. El-
wood, then joined the Array, On his return in 19ili4.j he
immediately began rebuilding the company and in 1950 it
showed a net profit after tax of $16,700. However, from
1951 to 19514- profits diminished greatly. In 1955 Mr, El-
wood was giving serious consideration to liquidating his
automobile dealership. In Mr. Elwood's opinion his re¬
turn was not adequate and he felt certain that he could
work for another dealer as a manager at a minimum salary
of $l5»000. The pro forma statement for 1955 anticipated
a net loss from operation; and in view of the poor per¬
formance of the preceding three years, he had become
quite pesslmiatlc,about the future prospects for this
line of business.
This company was not pressed by its creditors to pay
its debts, it had the ability to meet its debt payments at
maturity and its working capital position was relatively
strong. However, it was a failure, an economic failure.
Generally, economic failure is not referred to as an actual
failure and they can continue to operate at a profit as long
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as it pays its bills. Economic failure is only the first
stage of the failure process and in most instances lead to
financial failure,
Pinanclal failure.--A financial failure in contrast to
^Gordon Donaldson, Pearson Hunt, and Charles M,
Williams, Basic Business Finance (2nd ed,; Homewood Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc,, 1961), pp. 906-910,
^dwin T. Donaldson and John R, Pfahl, Corporate Fi¬
nance (2nd ed,; New York: The Ronald Press Co,, 1963), p. 690,
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an economic failure represents a condition in which losses
are uncommon occurrences and working capital becomes im¬
paired, This stage is evidenced by Inadequate earnings,
price cutting, and a weak trade position. In essence, a
financial failure occurs when the business can not pay its
debts. The business may liquidate and suspend its business
activity or it may seek some cooperative arrangement to keep
the business going.^ Reference is made to the case of Bau¬
man's, Inc., in which this type of failure is noted. Al¬
though Bauman's was a financial failure, it obtained the
assistance of creditor's committee which was able to re¬
habilitate it,
Bauman's, Inc., a retailer of quality home furnish¬
ing, was established as a partnership in 1915 and was
incorporated in 194-6. During 1951 the company experi¬
enced serious financial difficulties and required the
assistance of a creditor's committee. A review of the
financial statements by two credit men revealed the
seriousness of the situation. The accounts payable ledg¬
er indicated total pavables outstanding of $178,752, and
of this amount $l|.6,5i}I|- was for March alone. The bulk of
the company's purchases called for payment within 30 days
thus most of the accounts prior to February were past due
The balance sheet indicated an account ^Mortgage notes
payable - purchase obligation, $296,700.” The mortgage
carried a yfo interest, and the principal was payable at
the rate of $1,725 per month. The company had also bor¬
rowed from its bank of account $l4i|.,000, obtained on an
open line of credit. They also owed $14-1,738 on the orlg
Inal purchase of some real estate, which was secured by a
first mortgage and was payable at the rate of $16,675 an**
nually. Here, if the situation would not have been no¬
ticed, Bauman's, Inc. could have become a confirmed legal
failure.
The two credit men convinced the Bauman's of the
^Ibid.. p. 690.
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seriousness of the coiiipany's position, and they agreed
to a program calling for the following:
!• Holding a tremendous store wide sale to reduce
inventory as quickly as possible to free cash.
2. Paying cash for necessary purchases but buying
only ”flll-lns.”
3* Renegotiating the loan with the bank to free some
accounts receivable.
4. Atten5)ting to sell or pledge the freed accounts
receivable to a finance company using these funds to re¬
duce the bank loan, thereby eliminating the bank loan and
transferring the financing on accounts receivable to a
finance company irtiich would give more liberal credit*
5. Selling two pieces of real estate not essential
to the business.
6. Selling some personal property of Harold Bauman
worth approximately $34*500 and applying this to the busi¬
ness to reduce the item entitled ’’Due from officers.”
7* Paying off all creditors owed $100 or less*
8, Effecting sm Informal agreement with all other
creditors to handle the outstanding accounts on a de¬
ferred basis*
One of the first acts of the trustees was to pay all
creditors whose accounts amounted to $100 or less* This
reduced the 345 accounts to 204* ^ finance company was
contracted and arrangements were made to handle all cur¬
rent accounts receivable on a 70 per cent basis, thereby
gaining about $46,000, which was applied against the bank
loan and creditor's past-due accounts. The finance com¬
pany also agreed to buy time payment accounts on a non¬
recourse basis. The settlement with the creditors called
for payment of 25 per cent of the outstanding balance on
or before July 1, and for the remainder, twelve notes
carrying six per cent interest, to be retired within one
year. In addition to refinancing a portion of the accounts
receivable, the non essential real estate was sold* Al¬
though the proceeds were primarily used to pay the mort¬
gage on the property, the elimination of the fixed obli¬
gation eased the working capital position of the company*
By June l5 there was enough money to permit the payment
of notes one and two to the deferred creditors. With the
aid of the trustees, the company made sufficient progress
during the year to pay the nuz^ered notes on the follow¬
ing dates: on August 28, notes three and four; on Sep¬
tember 20, note five; on November 15 and December l5»
notes six and seven, respectively* The coiz^any continued
its progress by keeping a tight rein on operations, and
finally on May 5* 1952 note number twelve was called for
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paTtnent. At this time the trustees were dismissed*
This was surely a financial failure; however, the ac¬
tions of the creditor’s committee was able to forestall cred¬
itors and correct its financial difficulties* An Important
point to be noted here is that a con^any may be earning a
satisfactory return on its Investment, that is, it is not an
economic failure, but because of its inability to meet ma-
2
turlng obligations may fail* Unless the underlying causes
of failure are not detected and corrected the company will
surely proceed to the third stage of failure, legal failure*
Legal failure*--The third stage of failure, legal fail¬
ure has been defined under the bankruptcy act as a state of
insolvency ’’when the aggregate of the property . . * at a
fair evaluation is not sufficient in amount to pay his
debts*’’^ Stated differently, a business is a legal failure,
if there are fundamental weaknesses whose affects can not be
postponed indefinitely, and default occurs or is about to
take place. An example of a legal failure is the case of
Rolls Razor Ltd. . * , *
Rolls Razor Ltd*, a British firm, was a very success¬
ful household appliance manufacturer* At the time the
failure was announced the firmb president reported that
the situation was absolutely choatic* Rolls Razor was
^Gordon Donaldson, Pearson Hunt, and Charles M.
Williams, Basic Business Fiance (3rd* ed*; Homewood Illinois:
Richard D* Irwin, Inc*, 1966), pp* 975-982,
Donaldson and Pfahl, op.cit.* p, 691*
-^Bogen, op.cit.. p, 930*
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very badly managed toward the end, and its position
finally deteriorated beyond all hope of salvage. The
liquidator of Rolls Razor spoke of "complete confusion"
in the company’s affairs and added that many directors
were unaware of what was happening. Net profits of
$386,1).00 were being reflected on the company’s books
for the first half of 196lj. when there were, in fact,
losses exceeding $700,000. At the time of the liquida¬
tion procedures. Rolls Razor had a difficlency estimated
at over $11,200,000, and assets of about $2,156,000 from
which some $1,400,000 will have to go preferred credi¬
tors. The remaining $756,000 was distributed to the
general creditors.^
A company’s total assets may exceed its debts, but it
may be an economic or a financial failure. The failure usu¬
ally proceeds in the order of economic, financial and final¬
ly legal. However, failure may exist in one category with¬
out formerly being in another category.
^"The End of the Affair," The Economist. August, 196k,
p. 847.
CHAPTER III
THE FINANCIAL CAUSES OP BUSINESS FAILURE
The financial causes of business failures are, with
the assistance of competent management, the avoidable
causes. There is no one reason for a business failure.
Actually, failure is a many faceted phenomenon. Usually
the failure may be attributable to a number of factors,
but the apparent reason for the business failure may be a
lack of working capital. In such a case, lack of working
capital is the reason that it failed but not the cause.
Other factors cause the failure by dissipating the working
capital. The factors to be discussed may contribute signif¬
icantly to a lack of working capital and have, in many in¬
stances, been one of the contributing causes of the failure.
Excessive floating debt.—This is one of the most com¬
mon causes of failure. Floating debt la owed to trade cred¬
itors and banks. The failure occurs when the company does
not liave enough cash to meet these payisents. It may be due
to Inadequate investment by owners, over-expansion of cur¬
rent or fixed assets or both. Interest on borrowed funds,
deficit operations, too liberal salaries and bonuses, ex¬
cessive dividend payments, poor collection, losses on in¬
ventions or some other factors which may cause the business
20
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enterprise to lack the cash necessary to meet maturing debts.
Excessive floating debt can cause failure when a company Is
prosperous and management does not have enough Insight to
predict the funds required to support the expanded sales
volume. If goods are sold on sixty days credit and payments
are due within thirty days, expanding sales can cause a se¬
vere drain on working capital. Also If contracts are Involv¬
ed and no advances were made, the con^any must keep a tight
rein on Its expenses to conserve Its working capital. A
case exemplifying excessive floating debt would be the Doss
Manufacturing Company.
The Doss Manufacturing Con^any was engaged In manu¬
facturing machine tools. During the ten years that Mr.
Doss directed the business, sales Increased about ten¬
fold and earnings rose rapidly, although they did not
keep pace with the Increase In sales. The business
grew faster than could be supported by earnings. Addi¬
tional credit, both from suppliers and from local banks,
was Injected Into the business.
The funds supplied by trade creditors and the bank were
short-term. Although these funds were needed, they only con¬
tributed to the company’s current debt. More appropriate ac¬
tion would have been to secure additional equity funds or by
bonds. If possible. If It were possible to float a bond Is¬
sue the company would only have to meet the annual Interest
charges, and If they would have secured equity funds, no pay¬
ments would have been necessary.
At the time of the failure, suppliers were deeply In¬
volved In the debt structure, and the firm was more than
$200,000 In debt to a bank. The company was engaged In
filling a large order for a national concern In a neigh- .
boring state. ^I^he company may not have received any pre
payment on this order and It still had to make payments
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to their creditors,^/ The ixeraedlate cause of failure was
the calling of the $200,000 loan by the bank, Mr. Doss
could not pay his bills, and the plant closed. His bond¬
ing company shifted the project to another company*^
Failure here may be attributed to management's inabili¬
ty to control the company's floating debt. In this case ex¬
cessive floating debt was a primary cause, however, in many
cases it is only a contributing factor to a more primary cause.
Excessive fixed charges.—Once a corporation has floated
a bond issue it faces the problem of fulfilling the obliga¬
tions it has undertaken. It must find the means to pay in¬
terest at the designated rate as the semiannual payment dates
come around. The corporation must also be prepared to ful¬
fill the other convenants of the indenture, such as the pay¬
ment of taxes, the maintenance of properties, insurance, etc.
The corporation must remain solvent during the life of the
issue or they will face default. Difficulties may arise in
meeting these payments because of a gradual decline of net
earnings, because of a downward trend in a particular in¬
dustry or in business in general.
The Missouri Pacific Railroad Company between 1921 and
1930 ran into great difficulties in meeting its interest pay¬
ments, It never earned its fixed charges by as much as one
and three quarter times. The use of bonds rather than stock
in financing during this period can be explained by the low
earnings which gave rise to an accumulation of unpaid
^Small Business Administration, op.cit.. MRS: 2-63.
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preferred dividends that made both preferred and common prac¬
tically unavailable. In 1930 when the decline in earnings
began to make Itself evident, the fixed charges were earned
only 1*33 times. The ratio of bonds to stocks was 71 to 29
and surplus was relatively small. Consequently this company,
which was created in a reorganization in 1917 was one of the
1
first major railroads to fail in the ensuing depression.
In a period of prosperity when sales are expanding
additional funds are required. A bond issue may be the com¬
pany’s best means of securing the funds. If there is a
tight money market, and during a period of prosperity this
is usually the case, the bond interest will be high. When
decline begins, revenues will decrease before expenditures
can be cut back. The company must now meet the Interest
payments at a lower level of earnings. If the firm’s earn¬
ings are insufficient to meet these fixed charges they will
surely default. However, wise financial management can
avoid this. During the decline there is less competition
for funds. Therefore, everything being equal, the interest
rate will decrease. To relieve the burden of these fixed
interest payments, the company can refund the existing bond
issue. This situation was experienced by Coe Utility Com¬
pany.
^Hubert E. Dougall and Harry T. Guthmann, Corporate
Financial Management (2nd ed.: New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 191+6j, p, 571.
Coe Utility had 7^ coupon notes outstanding and was in
a tight working capital position. This was an extremely high
interest rate which put a severe strain on the working capital
position.
Because interest rates had declined Coe Utility, a
gas and electric company, wanted to refund an issue of
7% coupon notes callable at 105 and also to secure ad¬
ditional capital. Since it did not want to reduce the
high dividend rate on its outstanding common stock, and
since the state levied a tax on excess capital stock, the
company estimated that to issue first mortgage bonds
would be substantially cheaper than to offer a new issue
of common stock. The company decided to secure about two
thirds of the required sum by an issue of bonds and the re¬
mainder by the sale on the open market.of some common
stocks previously issued but not sold,"*"
Excessive funded debt,—If there is a shortage of work¬
ing capital at the maturity of a bond issue, the company must
secure external funds or default. Although the company may
have been meeting the fixed interest charges on these bonds
the shortage of working capital may have prevented them from
establishing a sinking fund to provide for the gradual re¬
tirement, The company may not be insolvent in the bankrupt¬
cy sense, but the working capital may not be sufficient to
provide the funds to pay the bonds and failure results. To
remedy such a situation the company could refund the bond
issue or seek an extension of the maturity. The difficulties
of the Lehigh Valley Railroad provides us with an exaii5>le of
how they handled the situation.
Graduate School of Business Administration, George P,
Baker Foundation, Harvard University, Harvard Business Re¬
ports. VI (New York: A. W. Shaw, 1926), p, 7.
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Although the Lehigh Valley Railroad has never, like
many other railroads, undergone a thorough reorganization,
it has suffered extreme fluctuations in both gross and
net earnings. The road had a period of marked prosperi¬
ty which reached its climax in 1926, During the year the
gross earnings of the system were over $80,000,000, and
of this amount approximately a third came from coal traf¬
fic, about half from frei^t, and approximately a sixth
from passengers, mail, and other miscellaneous receipts.
After 1926 the gross earnings steadily declined with ref¬
erence both to the coal traffic and the miscellaneous
freight. Prom a net, after fixed charges, of over $10,-
000,000 in 1926 the earnings declined to a deficit of
over $2,000,000 in 1931 and a deficit of over $14.,000,000
in 1932, In the summer of 1938 it was obvious that the
road must obtain some relief. The management believed
that if the Immediate demand for the payment of certain
fixed charges could be relieved, to a limited extent,
and if the dark shadow of a specific bond maturity, due
two years hence could be brushed aside, the road could
avoid bankruptcy.
Here it should be noted that management was aware of the
possibility of failure. Any company in such a situation
would have a very weak bargaining position, and as a result
the extent of any concessions made by the bondholders would
depend on the company’s past performance. Therefore, the
success or failure of a firm, in such a situation, would
depend on the bondholders appraisal of the firm’s earning
potential.
At the time in question the Lehigh Valley Railroad
was liable as guarantor in respect of three separate
Issues of bonds outstanding. These bonds aggregating
$33*500,000 and representing underlying issues, were
all coming due within the next few years. Also, with¬
in the next few years, several leased line bond Issues
would mature; and the management of the Lehigh Valley
Railroad knew that these bonds could be extended or re¬
funded only on the basis of the railroads own credit.
The Lehigh Valley Railroads plan of readjustment called
for the extension of the maturities of certain leased
line issues. In return for these concessions the manage¬
ment promised to establish certain sinking funds which
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would be used to decrease the funded debt of the road,
and these sinking funds would take precedence over the
future dividends on the stock. The relief secured by
the Lehigh Valley Railroad was.approved by the District
Court of Pennsylvania in 19^0
This case summary gives us an example of how excessive
funded debt nearly caused a failure; however, competent manage¬
ment avoided such a situation. It is important to note that
a continuous trading on equity can prove advantageous or it
can become burdensome. The lenders and those firms coming
under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Securities and Exchange Commission desire a gradual
decrease in indebtedness or an increase in common stock
2
equity.
Slow collection.--The time intervening between the pro¬
duction of the goods and the collection of receivables flow¬
ing from sales may adversely affect the company’s working
capital position. If purchases are on the cash basis and if
the manufacturing cycle is prolonged, wide gaps between cash
expenditures and cash receipts may place heavy financial
pressures on the company. These pressures may be eased if
the con5)any can persuade its suppliers to bear a larger part
of the financial burden. The complete opposite approach was
taken by Henry Ford when his company was in a tight working
Arthur S. Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corpora¬
tions (Vol. II, New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1953),
pp. 1481-1486,






capital position in 1920, Ford received funds from his
dealers.
During World War I the Ford Motor Company, like
others, had expanded. Early in 1920 the first indica¬
tion of the need for retrenchment was visible in occa¬
sional business failures. By June, sales of Ford cars
were falling off at a tremendous rate. Yet mterial men
demanded higher prices, and labor seemed to give leas and
less. The cost of manufacturing went soaring. Between
January 1 and April l8, 1921, the con^any had to meet ob¬
ligations of #5o»000,000 in cash. Ford solved the prob¬
lem in this way: In September of 1920, the company cut
the prices of cars although they still had large supplies
of stock bought at high prices. The cut brought Ford
prices below the cost of manufacturing. However, this
helped sales only ten^orarlly. Sales fell off again and
more drastic treatment was undertaken. They kept on mak¬
ing cars though sales did not justify their large produc¬
tion. They wanted to have as much of their stock as pos¬
sible manufactured into cars at the time the halt came.
Ford realized that as long as the company continued to
buy materials, suppliers would continue to hold prices
up. Late in December he stopped manufacturing resolving
not to resume production until he could buy materials at
peacetime prices. Assembling went on at all branches.
In the meantime the business went through a thorough
house-cleaning. When they closed down they had about
93*000 finished cars. Their first move was to sell some
of the cars on hand. They shipped to dealers enough cars
to take care of approximately twenty-five days sales, A
total of 12^,000 cars were shipped to 17*000 willing and
unwilling dealers. Agents were bluntly told that they
were indebted to the Ford Company and that to prosper in
the future they must assist now. Those who rebelled were
removed. Between January 1 and April 1, Ford turned $27*-
700,000 worth of stock into cash. Then they began to turn
miscellaneous assets into cash. Altogether they raised
$59,300,000,more than enough to meet their Impending ob¬
ligations.^
Ford was a success in acquiring the funds primarily
because of the strategy he used. It can not be overly em¬
phasized that competent management is essential for success
^Charles W, Gerstenberg, Financial Organization and
^nagement of Business (l|.th ed, rev.; Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc,, I960), p, 303-30l|.,
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in business. We could contrast this case with that of W, C,
Durant of General Motors, Mr, Durant and Mr. Ford were con¬
fronted by the same problem during the same period.
General Motors total inventory in January 1920 stood
at #137 million, Mr, Durant, supported by the divisional
sales manager, attei)^)ted for a time to maintain prices
and to guarantee dealers and customers against any reduc¬
tion, By October inventories had reached $209 million,
and the situation had become so serious for General Mo¬
tors that many managers were having difficulty locating
cash to pay Invoices and payrolls. In that month General
Motors borrowed #83 million from banks on short term notes.
In November all major car producing units except Buick and
Cadillac, had virtually shut down their plants, and those
two were operating at reduced levels. This and other de¬
velopments, especially Mr, Durant's speculation in the
stock market, led to his resignation from General Motors,
During this period the entire United States economy fell
into a sluB^ and the rehabilitation of General Motors was
left to the wise and wealthy Pierre S, DuPont who succeed¬
ed Mr, Durant,^
The ability of a firm to secure funds to relieve a
tight working capital position could mean the difference be¬
tween success and failure. The two cases illustrated two
means of securing cash. In such a situation the solution
of the problem would depend on Internal and external condi¬
tions and the cost of acquiring these funds.
Unwise dividend policy.—Unwise dividend policy could
mean failure when a company maintains its dividend rate
during periods of declining profits. In some cases liberal
dividends are paid right up to the time that failure is ad¬
mitted, In other cases dividends are paid out of surplus
^Alfred P, Sloan, Jr., Mr Years With General Motors.
ed, John McDonald and Catharine Stevens (New York: Mac-
Fadden-Bartell Corporation, 1965), p, 31-^2,
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when there is a deficit for the particular period. This
was the cause of the failure of G-irard Grocers, Inc.
Girard Grocers, Inc., a wholesale grocery firm,
which had sustained a serious impairment of capital in
1920, in the following year show a net operating profit.
Although the profit was small, in comparison with the
impairment suffered, the directors declared dividends
on the strength of the current earnings. They continued
to follow this policy until 1926 when the company went
bankrupt. In an action brought against the directors by
a trustee to compel the return of the funds paid out as
dividends, the court decided in favor of the trustee con¬
cluding that the earned profit ’’reduced the Impairment,
and the declaration of the dividend again impaired the
capital to the extent of the dividend declared.”2
In considering whether a dividend should be declared
or not several factors should be taken into consideration.
The first factor to consider is the legal one. In a majori¬
ty of states it is illegal to pay a dividend if such action
would impair the company's capital.
The second factor to consider is the working capital
requirements. Cash dividend payments reduce working capital
since the cash is distributed in the form of dividends.
Whether this disbursement of cash for dividends rather than
for other corporate purposes is wise depends upon the con¬
ditions within the corporation and general economic condi¬
tions. If it appears that the business is entering upon a
period of recession, conservatism should be followed, for
the business may need all of its cash revenues to carry it
^Donaldson and Pfahl, op.cit.. p. 697*
2
Graduate School of Business Administration, George F.
Baker Foundation, Harvard University, op.cit.. Vol. VII,
p . 20 •
30
safely through the period of decline. This is exemplified
in the case of Session Refrigerator Company,
The Session Refrigerator Company, a refrigerator
manufacturing company, had paid no dividends on its pre¬
ferred stock from the tliw of its organization in 1919
to 1923. Between February 1923 and March 19214. it paid
five quarterly dividends on both its first and second
preferred stock and also began to pay back dividends on
the second preferred stock. An audit of the books in
March, 1924.» revealed that the company had operated at
a deficit during the first six months of the current
fiscal year. The officials did not believe this to be
an extraordinary situation, since sales were of a sea¬
sonal nature and the company manufactured largely for
stock during the first half of the year. Nevertheless,
although the company was in need of new permanent cap¬
ital and to pass a dividend on preferred stock would
make the sale of any form of security difficult, the
company decided to pass.its dividends in order to pro¬
tect its cash position.'^
Here the company realized that their present liquidity
was more in^)ortant than the future need for funds.
In declaring a dividend the board of directors also
considers the tax affect the dividend would have on its
stockholders. Although this factor is not relative to the
study it is considered in the formulation of dividend policy.
The directors would also consider other corporate needs.
They should exercise care in determining whether there is
really a surplus. They should check to see if all necessary
reserves have been set aside and that surplus has been de-
2
rived from sources available for dividends.
^Graduate School of Business Administration, George P,
Baker Foundation, Harvard University, op.cit.. Vol. V, p. 13.
2
Joseph H. Bonneville, Lloyd E. Dewey and Harry M.
Kelly, Organizing and Financing Business (oth ed. Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I960), p, 583*
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Payment of excessive dividends may cause such a drain
on funds as to leave the corporation hard pressed for funds
in an emergency. The payment of a large proportion of net
income may be justified in the case of con^janies with very
stable earnings or on unusually strong backlog of quick as¬
sets, but most companies should retain at least some of its
earnings as a cushion or buffer against periods of low re¬
turns. In 19^7 the directors of John Morrel and Company
omitted the dividend normally declared at that time for pay¬
ment in Julyj the con5>any’s president indicated that the
board considered the additional working capital needed be¬
cause of high livestock prices and working capital require¬
ments related to an expansion of operations in a number of
cities.^ This is one instance of wise dividend policy, the
wrong decision here may have led the company into a series
of financial difficulties and maybe even failure.
Inadequate provisions for maintenance and deprecia¬
tion.—Inadequate provisions for maintenance and deprecia¬
tion will over-state earnings and give management a mis¬
leading view of the company’s financial position. This may
result in excessive dividend payments. These payments being
made partly from capital rather than from profits. Such a
policy, if continued for a long period, could result in the
eventual wearing out of the property, and no cash will be
^J. B. Cohen and S. M. Robbins, The Financial Manager
(New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p, 30ljfl
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available to replace it. Adequate provisions should be main¬
tained during the life of the property to replace it when it
wears out. In addition to this, normal incident of leakage,
breakage, of repainting surfaces subject to rotting or corro¬
sion, should be attended to as a matter of routine business.
The deterioration or decay of a physical structure will be
greater if ordinary repairs are neglected. Maintenance by
repairs and allowances for depreciation are two phases of
the same underlying phenomenon, the deterioration of physical
property, and they both are cared for by direct appropria¬
tions out of earnings,^
Inadequate provisions for maintenance and depreciation
will cause earnings to be overstated and result in higher
income tax payments. After payment of these unnecessary
taxes over a period of years the company may not have the
funds to repurchase needed assets. This would force them
to seek external funds or continue to use the assets. These
external funds may only be available at high interest rates.
If they continue to use the obsolete assets, this could
weaken their competitive position.
Inadequate provisions for maintenance and depreciation
was one of the causes of the failure of the Seaboard Air Line
Railway, As stated previously, failure can not be attributed
to one factor, it is a combination of unfavorable events.
^Arthur S. Dewing, op.cit., Vol, I, p, 572.
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This was the case of the Seaboard Air Line Railway which went
into receivership in 1908,
The first year of integrated operation for the whole
system - 1900-1901 - yielded |10,500,000 gross earnings
and $12,800,000 net before fixed charges. But out of
these earnings $2,500,000 went for interest and rentals,
and little was expended to maintain or to improve the
loosely integrated railway system. For the next five
years there was little Improvement in earnings and the
year June 1907, showed a deficit of $300,000 after
charges and Inadequate maintenance. During January,
1908, receivers were appointed for the Seaboard system,
and the year ending six months later,indicated a def¬
icit of over half a million dollars.
Inadequate provisions for maintenance and depreciation
and other factors characteristic of railroad failure ledi
the Seaboard to go into receivership.
Overexpans ion,—Overexpans ion is considered to be the
most common and the most Important cause of the failure of
2
large business enterprises. If sales are growing and prof¬
its are increasing, and if the company finds it relatively
easy to borrow money, expansion can be very tempting. Manage¬
ment must realize that expansion leads a business Into an en¬
tirely new situation. The business is enlarged and the prob¬
lems are also. The new enlarged business has new sales, dis¬
tribution, advertising, collection, and procurement problems.
These problems may have been easy to handle previously, how¬
ever, these larger functions may not be easy to coordinate.
The case of Lester and Pride Incorporated provides us
^Arthur S, Dewing, op.cit.. Vol. II, p. 1462,
^Ibid.. p. 1220,
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with an example of how overexpansion caused failure. In this
case, as in many others, the cause of the failure can not be
attributed to one factor, it was a combination of unfavorable
events. However, the expansion required additional financing
which became burdensome when their volume of sales declined.
In March, of 1950, Harley Lester and Charles Pride
formed a partnership in Kansas City, Kansas, to manufac¬
ture and distribute a low priced air conditioning unit.
Initial sales exceeded expectations, and the partnership
soon began to grant exclusive sales franchises to retail¬
ers in neighboring cities. The partners needed addition¬
al capital if they were to handle the prospective volume
of business.
In Septeiaiber of 1951 the firm was incorporated. The
corporation immediately sold 2,000 shares of 6 per cent
cumulative preferred stock to Mr. Lester for $200,000,
the proceeds being used to make a down payment on new
manufacturing facilities. A purchase money mortgage of
$600,000 was accepted by the previous owner. In 1952-
1953 the company expanded its operation to cover six
mldwestern states with sales reaching $5j5it-0,000 per
annum. Sales of $7*500,000 were forecasted for 1954*
In order to finance the continuing growth in asset re¬
quirements, additional shares of preferred and common
stock were sold. Both of the original partners made
additional investments in the company during this pe¬
riod by purchasing units of preferred and common stock,
but 70 per cent, or 5*600 shares of common had to be
placed privately with individual investors.
Sales in 1954 exceeded expectations, and in order
to finance additional equipment, inventory, and accounts
receivable, the company issued a combination of unse¬
cured debentures plus common stock. A twenty year unse¬
cured debenture carrying a coupon rate of interest of
6.5 per cent was offered to private investors in units
of $1,000 face value of debenture and twenty shares of
common stock for a total price of $1,100 per unit. Be¬
tween October of 1954 April of 1955* o50 imits at
a price of $435*000 had been sold to a total of twelve
Investors.
In 1955 the market for air conditioners became more
competitive, and Lester and Pride Incorporated managed
to maintain their physical sales volume only by substan¬
tial price reductions, which cut seriously into the com¬
pany’s profit margin. Net earnings for the year were
only $54*800, The conpany paid its preferred dividend,
although they were not fully cornered by earnings. In
1956 unseasonably cool weather cut sharply into the air
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conditioning sales across the country and Harley noted
the alarming buildup of inventories. Furnished goods
plus work-in-process represented more than 50 per cent
of total assets on December 31, 1956, and the bank put
pressure on the company to liquidate a large part of
its inventory, releasixig funds to meet maturing notes
at the bank.
After a series of meetings in January, 1957* be¬
tween Mr. Lester, Mr. Pride and various officers of the
bank, the bank agreed to renew the existing line of cred¬
it for a sixty-day period if every effort was made to re¬
duce the excessive finished goods inventory so that at
least $500,000 could be paid on the bank's notes. In
an effort to meet the sixty day deadline on the $500,000
of the bank's line of credit, the company reduced prices
on its air conditioning units once more, and at the same
time reduced production from 80 per cent to 6o per cent
of capacity. Trade creditors began to press for payment
on overdue bills, and rumblings were heard from the de¬
benture bond holders. In order to prevent further dete¬
rioration the bank agreed in July 1957 to a work-out ar¬
rangement ,
At the Insistence of the bank representative on the
board of directors, all production was suspended during
the last two months of 1957, and sales were limited to
ttie styles and models of air conditioners in the com¬
pany's inventory on hand. Limited, piece-meal production
was initiated in February of 1958* it was obvious that
Lester and Pride could no longer compete effectively on
either a price or a quality basis with the new model air
conditioners. On June 1, 1958, the bank and a group of
five trade creditors filed a chapter X petition of bank¬
ruptcy against Lester and Pride, Incorporated, in the
federal district court,^
Poor financial planning.--Financial planning is defined
as:
A forward looking appraisal of the financial aspects of
the business program, leading to decisions regarding the
most effective course of action to be taken over a future
period,*^
^James R. Longs treet. Cases in Financial Management
(San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Co,, Inc., 1961),
pp. 218-223,
ogen, op.cit.. p. 669,
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The objective of financial planning is to earn a satis¬
factory profit for the immediate future and the long run and
to place the enterprise in a sound financial position. Every
phase of business planning has financial implications and
every phase of business planning is concerned with ^at is
sought through financial planning. It is the duty of top
management to select the important phases of business opera¬
tions that bear most directly upon the financial condition
and earning power of the enterprise, and practical financial
planning will be concerned chiefly with these. Financial
planning deals with the planning of capital structure, the
preparation of cash budgets and forecasts, the management
of working capital, the management of fixed assets, the for¬
mulation of corporate financial policies and projections of
balance sheets and operating statements. The financial
manager jeopardizes the company’s financial security when
he omits any aspect of financial planning.
The case of Good Deal Supermarkets is a case in point
of how poor financial planning nearly caused failure. The
following is an excerpt of a speech made by Samuel Aldekman,
President and Chairman of the Board of Good Deal Super mar¬
kets.
What happened? We started to lose money, but I
couldn’t turn off the expansion fast enough. We were
eager to achieve success. Sure - I knew better than
most operators. Doubling volume was no task. After
all, sales and profits were tremendousi Couldn’t I
beat that record and double them (sales) each in two
years or perhaps each year? What guidance did I look
for? What guidance did I receive from our accountants
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who were excellent auditors and top tax people? I
didn’t seek* nor did they offer any advice or guidance,
I am not blaming them - j’ist stating facts fairly. We
had project for one, two, and five years. Sure - but
what did we project? We projected store count, profits,
sales, personnel training, key people development and
stature. We projected all of these carefully. But what
didn’t we project? Cash flows and new store opening cost.
Ah, there’s the rob. Cash was going out much faster than
it was coming in, I wasn’t surprised to see a loss state¬
ment in early 1961, The next day I searched for a new ac¬
counting firm. This was the best thing that happened to
me. For the first time I knew in what direction I was
headed financially and what action was required. Every
move was watched carefully - expense slashed - cash flows
planned, projected and controlled. In a few days our
cash flow was back to normal. We were back on the right
track. We had put up a vigorous fight and in three months
we were operating profitably,^
Here, Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc, was rescued from a
situation that could have led to legal failure. The whole
situation could have been avoided by sound financial manage¬
ment.
The failure of a business enterprise is caused by a
nuniber of factors. In cases previously discussed, the finan¬
cial causes of failure were only contributing factors. Knowl¬
edge of the importance of such causes will give management
the desire to control them. If these factors are allowed to
become uncontrollable they can definitely lead to failure.
^Samuel Aidekman, ”To the Brink and Back,” Credit and
Financial Management {August, 1961}.), p, 3ll-,
CMPTER IV
TECHNIQUES USED TO IDENTIFY FAILURE TENDENCIES
If the businessman is able, through alertness, study,
and analysis, to detect failure tendencies, he may be able
to prevent them. Many external conditions which may lead
to failure are quickly reflected within the business. If
adequate records are maintained, the facts shown by such
records should be constantly studied in connection with in-
formation obtainable from external sources in order to make
proper and timely measures, not only to prevent the effects
of an unfavorable development, but to take steps to profit
on any favorable opportunity.
Use of ratios with ease analysis.--One of the most
significant means of detecting failure tendencies is the use
of ratios. A ratio is a method of stating a percentage re¬
lationship without the use of the term percent. It has be¬
come customary to express certain relationships as ratios
and to egress other relationships as percentages,^ To be
useful, a number of ratios must be compared with the same
ratios of previous periods. In doing this, we can con5)are
^Carlisle R, Davis and Edward T. Gee, American Insti¬
tute of Banking, Analyzing Financial Statements (New York:
American Institute "of Bailing, 196i|.), p. l6o.
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any significant changes, analyze their causes, and detect any
trends. These ratios should then be con^jared to ratios of
competitors and to the average industry ratios. By compari¬
son management will be in a better position to see how it is
holding up in coit5)etition and whether its own ratios are out
of line with the industry.
By referring to Dun and Bradstreet’s Key Business
Ratios In 125 Lines, the financial manager can compare his
firm’s ratios with the Industry’s averages. This booklet
contains fourteen ’’basic” ratios and the average for those
in the upper quartile, the median, and the lower quartile,^
The following discussions will be concerned with some of
these ratios and their meaning.
Current assets to current debt.—This is popularly
known as the current ratio and is the current assets divid¬
ed by the current liabilities. This ratio measures the ex¬
tent to which current assets may decline and still be suffi¬
cient to cover current liabilities.
Net profits to net sales.—This is the percentage
ratio of net Income after taxes to sales. This ratio indi¬
cates how much of the sales dollar is profit for the owner
or owners.
Net profits on tangible net worth.—This ratio is com¬
puted by dividing the net profit by net worth. This ratio
^Key Business Ratios in 12B Lines - 1963 (New York:
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 1963)* p. 3*
is used In measuring the efficiency of the management in em¬
ploying the owners investment* This ratio also measures the
rate of profit return on the owners capital funds.
Net sales to tangible net worth.—This ratio is eome-
tiraes referred to as the turnover of net worth. This ratio
is a measure of the efficiency with which the company’s in¬
vestment is used in producing sales.
Net sales to net working capital.—This ratio measures
the efficiency with which the current assets are utilized in
producing sales.
The collection period.—The annual net sales are divid¬
ed by 365 days to obtain the average daily sales, then the
average daily sales are divided into the notes and accounts
receivable. This ratio Indicates any difficulties experi¬
enced in collection of accounts and often reflect a decline
in business conditions.
Net sales to inventory.—This ratio is computed by
dividing the net sales or the cost of goods sold by the in¬
ventory* It indicates the number of times the inventory or
stock is sold out during the year. This ratio quickly re¬
flects changes in demand and management policies such as in¬
ventory control, poor merchandising or obsolete merchandise
stocks.
Current liabilities to tangible net worth.--This ratio
shows the extent to which the day to day operations are being
financed through short term sources. In a seasonal business,
this ratio will show variation because the management will
kl
rely upon short term sources to finance peak requirements.
This ratio is also useful in indicating the extent that the
short term creditors are protected by Invested capital.
Working capital to funded debt.--This ratio is obtained
by dividing the working capital by the funded debt. It re¬
flects the extent to which total debt is protected by current
assets.
These are only a few of the ratios which the financial
manager can use to detect a deteriorating financial position.
It should be remembered that ratios are signals or red flags
used to spotlight difficulties. It should also be remembered
that no structural ratio per se is good or bad. It must be
related to industry norms and analyzed as to trend. Note
for example, a firm may have an excellent current ratio but
upon close examination it may be found that slow-moving in¬
ventory or uncollectable accounts receivable account for it.
On the other hand, the current ratio may be changing from
year to year. In such a case the reasons should be deter¬
mined which point up the need to construct and analyze trend
ratios. Here, some clarification may be necessary in regard
to structural and trend ratios. The ratios of the items in
a financial statement to each other measure the magnitude of
the items and therefore are measures of the financial struc¬
ture on a given date. Trend ratios measure the trends of
the various items over periods of tirae,^
^John N, Myer, Financial Statement Analysis (3rd, ed.:
Englewood Cliffs, N, J.: Trentice-Hall, Inc,, 1961), p, 175»
A useful Instrument which may be employed in bringing
the whole area of ratio analysis into meaningful focus is
given in the Appendix, The case of Modern Furniture Company
will now be analyzed using form as given in the Appendix.
For the first time in more than ten years the Modem
Furniture Company was unable to meet the maturity date
on an unsecured bank loan, Mr. Carlson, owner and manager,
hoped to obtain, at a minimum, an extension of his $55»-
000 unsecured note and, if possible an increase in his
bank line of credit.
The company normally borrowed from the DeVon State
Bank to finance its seasonal expansion of current assets
during the late summer and fall and cleaned up its bank
loans by November or December, The current line of cred¬
it permitted unsecured loans up to $60,000 and required
payment in full for the outstanding note by February l5»
1958.
During the last half of 1957 the market for furniture
deteriorated and courpetltive pressures borrowed profit
margins substantially. Sales for the Industry were 10
per cent below the level in the second half of 1958,
Modern Furniture Company, however, had actually achieved
a small Increase in sales during the last six months, as
a result of the agressive selling policies adopted by Mr,
Carlson,
In order to pres»inre the company’s share of its reg¬
ular market, Mr. Carlson met all price reductions of his
regional competitors and was able to reduce the delifiery
time on all incoming orders. He also expanded his mar¬
keting territory by making special price concessions in
new areas. In 1957 sales were made to western buyers for
the first time, when Mr, Carlson negotiated contracts with
a series of large discount houses in California,
The west coast sales were made at prices averaging
120 per cent of cost of goods sold on terms of sixty days.
As of December 31» 1957, the conpany had received orders
totaling $100,000 of which $80,000 had been shipped and
billed to the discount houses. While the selling price
on such orders were well below normal markups, and even
below the estimated average total cost. Mr. Carlson felt
that the 20 per cent gross profit margin made a contribu¬
tion toward the fixed overhead cost, since the company
would otherwise have had substantial idle capacity.
The company sou^t and obtained quality discounts on
its purchases of raw materials, and frequently obtained
discounts of 10 - 15 per cent by stepping into distress
situations to purchase excessive Inventories of competi¬
tors or to accept early deliveries by suppliers pressed
for funds,
Mp. Cooper, vice president and chief loan officer of
the DeVon State Bank, knew that Modern Furniture had re¬
cently fallen behind on its payment to suppliers and was
classed as a "slow pay.” He estimated that the company
had lost or had been unable to take advantage of the 2
per cent trade discount on more than $150,000 worth of
purchases during 1957, and that in some cases the com¬
pany was sixty days late in paying invoices carrying
trade terms of 2/l0, net 30.
In Mr, Cooper’s opinion, the potential working cap¬
ital problems of Modern Furniture were primarily those
of rapid growth and overly ambitious expansion. In
1956 the company had an opportunity to purchase, for
cash, the land and building that it had been renting
for warehouse facilities at a price of $22,700. In
Mr. Carlson’s opinion this was a good buy. At the
same time he made substantial modernization and im¬
provements in the machinery and equipment at a cost of
|l5,000. In Mr. Cooper’s opinion the expenditures rep¬
resented an unwarranted cash drain. Exhibit I shows
Modern Furniture Company’s balance sheets, operating
statements, and other financial data for selected years.
In analyzing the financial condition of such a company
certain basic questions must be answered:
1. Is the company trading on equity excessively?
That is, given a downturn in sales over a sustained period
of time, can the company meet its debt commitments?
2. Is the firm over-expanded in non-current assets
such that its breakeven point is too high to be competitive
in its industry?
3. Does the company have adequate working capital?
ij.. Is the company speculating in inventory or appears
not to have control over its inventory?
5. Is the company properly controlling its receivables?








Cash 1 13,200 # 17,900 # 9,400 # 5,400
Accounts
Receivable, Net 45,400 61,400 70,200 104,800
Inventories 51,200 77,400 127,400 186,600
Land & Buildings,
Cross 18,200 19,700 42,700 42,700
Machinery &
Equipment, Gross 32,900 47,500 44,000 44,000
Other Assets 2,500 6,900 2,100 1,900
Total 11537400“ #230,800 f295,tJ00 #387,400
Notes Payable-
Bank $ -0- # -0- # 25,000 $ 60,000
Accounts Sc Notes
Payable 22,200 24,100 37,00 74,500
Accruals 10,400 11,500 14,200 15,800
Mortgage 12,500 8,500 7,500 6,500
Reserve for Depre-
elation-Building 5,000 9,500 10,900 12, 600
Reserve for Depre-
elation. Machinery
Sc Equipment 13»500 11,000 14,700 18,900
Common Stock 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Paid-in Surplus 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000
Earned Surplus 29.800 96.200 116.500 129.100
Total #163,400 #230,800 #295,800 #387,400
Coi^aratlve Income Statement
19SS 1956 19S7
Net Sale #697,400 #695,300 #714,500
Direct Labor and
Raw Material 346,200 344,500 363,600
Indirect Labor 92,aoo 99,200 101,500
Other Ifenufacturing
Expense 65,400 69,800 72,500
Salarles-Selling Sc
Adm. 59,000 60,000 61,500
Other Sel. Sc Ad.Exp,. 75,000 74,900 77,300
Depreciation 4,100 4,400 5,900
Miscellaneous 15.000 15,100 16,400
Income taxes, federal 12.300 7.100 3.200
Net Profit # 28,200 # 20,360 #12,600
6. Has the past operating experience of the company been
satlsfact/ory and what are the prospects for the future?
Using the Modern Furniture Company and the form provided
In the Appendix, these questions can be answered.
In regard to the equities it should be noted that the
company Is not trading excessively on equity, but the ratio
of net worth to liabilities has declined significantly in
the last three years. This ratio declined from 2,57 in 1955
to 1.05 in 1957* This decline can be attributed to the in¬
crease in floating debt. However, the net worth has in¬
creased significantly. This company can not be considered as
trading excessively on equity because its ratio of net worth
to liabilities according to Dun and Bradstreet is in the upper
quartlle of the industry.
In regard to the non-current assets, the ratios indicate
that the company has over-expanded. Non-current assets are
41|- per cent of net worth. The industry average is 8,2 per
cent. This has increased the company's breakeven point which
has been a contributing factor in its financial difficulties.
The company's non-current assets have increased 6i|^ in the
past six years and 19^ in the last three years.
The con^any's working capital has been declining for
the past three years, and if the present trends continue it
will have a severe shortage. Presently, it takes the company
191 days to turnover its inventory and the turnover of current
assets is 21^3 days. This seriously affects the flow of funds,
especially when the credit terms in the industry is net thirty
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days. The company's current ratio is 1.99 which is in the
lower quartile for the industry. The working capital is
turned over 7.2 times a year, which indicates that the com¬
pany is attempting to do a larger volume of sales per dollar
of working capital. The company is borrowing voluntarily and
involuntarily to carry the present volume of inventory. In
conclusion, the working capital is at an all time low and the
coi^any must seek external assistance to meet current commit¬
ments.
In regard to inventory, the company's inventory turnover
of 3*8 is well below the industry's average of 7.2. Although
the inventory turnover has declined significantly, the commod¬
ity volume of sales has been constantly increasing. The
Commodity volume of inventory has Increased 2li. per cent in
the past three years, but the company has not been able to
maintain its percentage mark-up during this period. The
present inventory is 368 per cent of the 1951 level. The
ratios indicate that the company is speculating in inventory
and it is now at an uncontrollable level.
The coiiq>any is also having difficulties with its re¬
ceivables. The structural ratio of sales to receivables lias
declined from 11.2 to 6.7 in the past six years. Although
the coi^any has Increased its volume of sales, it has been
more liberal in extending credit. The ratios indicate that
the company has not held proper control over its receivables
and this has slowed the flow of funds through the company.
Although the commodity volume of sales has increased the
kl
net profit on sales has decreased. One factor contributing
to this Is price reductions the coii^}an7 has been making.
The company has not been able to maintain Its operating ex¬
pense while Increasing sales volume. The net profit on sales
has declined from 2.47 in 1955 to 1.7 in 1957. The company's
operating experience for the past two years has been very un¬
satisfactory.
By analyzing the Modern Furniture Company's financial
statementsj structural and trend ratios have been helpful In
detecting weak spots. After these spbts have been detected,
management can initiate a program to take corrective action.
If It Is too late for corrective action to be taken, other
measures can be taken to offset unfavorable effects. Also,
banks are more liberal in extending funds if management demon¬
strates ability to detect a deteriorating financial position.
Use of Comparative Statements
Ratios are useful tools, however, they must be supple¬
mented by further financial analysis. Comparative analysis
of financial statements will be useful in detecting further
deteriorating conditions. A strong financial condition, as
revealed by the financial statements, should indicate con¬
tinued solvency and profitability, however, this may not be
true for the following reasons:
1. The financial condition revealed by the financial
statements may not be typical.
2. A single balance sheet or income statement does
not reveal whether the company's financial condition
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is stronger or weaker than at the previous state¬
ment date •
3* The trend of the company's financial condition is
more important than its present condition.
One of the most important reasons for con^aring state¬
ments is to detect trends. The operating statements over a
period of years reflects trends of sales, expenses, and prof¬
its which are of great significance in detecting deteriorating
conditions. If unfavorable trends have been evident for some
years, the probability of Improved operating results is ques¬
tionable. Since the future can be estimated on the basis of
the past, the operating trend enables the financial manager
to appraise the probable future success of the company. The
trend can never be deteritilned from a single statement. The
comparative statement of the Modern Furniture Company, as
given in the Appendix, was helpful in analyzing unfavorable
trends. The comparative statement showed changes in the
various accounts and spotlighted the major difficulties. As
stated previously no structural ratio, per se, is good or
bad; it must be related to industry norms and analyzed as to
trends. The comparative statement shows these trends.
Use of Other Devices to Spotlight Difficulties
In order to determine if a business is susceptable to
the various causes of failure, it is helpful to analyze how
well the management utilize the available resources to maxi¬
mize profit. A useful device in measuring this is the source
and application of funds statement. The purpose of the source
and application of funds statement is to measure the flow of
funds in a business. In preparing such a statement the net
changes in assets* liabilities* and net worth accounts are
calculated from one balance sheet date to another.^ The
major types of changes are classified "Sources of Funds" and
"Uses of Funds," "Sources of Funds” are:
1« Decreases in assets
2, Increases in liabilities
3« Increases in net worth
"Uses of Funds” are:
1* Increase in assets
2. Decrease in liabilities
3. Decreases in net worth
The source and application of funds statement implement the
static balance sheet to offer a more dynamic view of the
flow of funds through the business. It is a "Profile of
laanagerial operating and financial results that add qualita-
_2
tive meaning to quantitative measurements.”
An Important aspect of avoiding failure is forecasting
the future needs for funds. Once the future need for funds
is determined* management can take action to secure these
funds before its financial position begins to deteriorate.
Such forward planning keeps management on top of any unfavor¬
able situation that may develop. Also* any project that may
^Donaldson* Hunt* and Williams* op.eit.. p. 133*
2
Gerstenberg* oo.cit.. p. 387.
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cause an excessive drain on cash may be postponed until the
company la In a better financial position. By the use of
the cash flow forecast and the projected balance sheets manage¬
ment can determine the future need for funds.
The cash flow Is considered the most basic and compre¬
hensive method of predicting the future need for funds. The
cash flow seeks to predict when and In what quantity receipts
of cash will come Into the firm and when and In what quantity
payments of cash wlUbe made.^ The cash flow forecast may be
developed on a monthly basis or It may be broken down Into
weeks or even days If necessary. The first section of the
budget Is used to summarize the monthly cash receipts and
disbursements originating from normal business operations.
The monthly changes In cash are then applied to the opening
balances. The additional sources and applications of cash
are reported In arriving at the estimated cash balance on
hand at the end of the month. The cash flow statement Is
usually accompanied by schedules that offer detail support
for the data given In the statement. Expenses which do not
require cash outlays are not Included In the cash flow fore¬
cast. The cash flow statement enables management to compare
standards that have been set and the actual results achieved
through operations. Variations between standard and actual
results are evaluated, and adjustments can be made If desired.
^Donaldson, Hunt, and Williams, op.clt.. p. l5l.
51
If failure tendencies are present, they will be evidenced by
a decline In'the flow of funds through the business.
Another device to forecast future requirements Is the
projected balance sheet» sometimes called the pro forma
balance sheet. The projected balance sheet Involves the fore¬
cast of the net investment In assets In order to carry out
operations at the level planned on a specific date. It also
involves the forecast of the liabilities that will be incurred
in the planned level of operation and an estimate of the net
worth on that date. The projected assets are compared with
the liabilities and net worth, and if the assets exceed the
liabilities and net worth, the difference is the additional
sources that must be obtained if the operations are to pro¬
ceed as planned. If the liabilities and net worth exceed the
assets, the difference represents the cash that will be avail¬
able above the required minimum.^
These techniques are used not only to detect a deteriorat¬
ing financial position, but also to aid management in planning
the future course of action. By the use of coirparative state¬
ments, both structural and trend ratios can be used to indi¬
cate strong and weak points. If these strong and weak points
are known management has a better view of the company’s fi¬
nancial status and is in a better position to make financial
decisions. The source and application of funds statement,
^Ibid.. p. I6l.
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Is useful In analyzing loanageinent past performance. This is
also helpful In making future financial decisions. The cash
flow statement and the project balance sheet are used to pro¬
ject future requirements* If the firms future requirements
are known management can take steps to secure the required
funds. These tools are useless If they are not practiced




The cause of a business failure is merely a matter of
judgment. In fact, there is no one cause of a failure. The
failure is attributed to many factors and it is a difficult
task to assign weight to these various factors. It is easy
to list the causes of failure, but because of the complexity
of the business environment it is difficult to measure the
extent of these causes. It can not be said that excessive
fixed charges, or excessive floating debt, or slow collection,
etc,, is the cause of failure. It can only be said that these
factors contribute to failure which is actually a conglomera¬
tion of unfavorable events. This is traceable to a more basic
cause of failure, that of incompetent management. All of the
internal causes of failure, and specifically the financial
causes of failure are the results of Incon^etent management.
The management is incoopetent because it does not realize the
extent that these causes will affect the business and it does
not utilize the available analytical tools to detect these
causes in their early stage. If management has proper control
over the business it can take corrective action before a chain
reaction of difficulties begin.
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511.
The primary purpose for listing and discussing the fi¬
nancial causes of business failure is to shed some light on
a topic that has heretofore received little attention. The
causes discussed and the cases illustrated were primarily
for possible application in future situations. If any topic
discussed or case illustration can be helpful in preventing
failure the purpose of this paper would have been accomplish¬
ed, The techniques used to identify failure tendencies share
equal importance with the financial causes of failure. If
the failure has not occurred, but failure tendencies are pres¬
ent, corrective action can avoid failure. The techniques dis¬
cussed are not an exhaustive detailed study. Its purpose is
to convince management of the need for the understanding the
adaption of these techniques,
A study of business failure can not begin to give manage¬
ment a guide by which it is sure to achieve success. The study
of business failure is purely subjective. The business en¬
terprise does not operate in a vaccum and many intervening
variables will have to be taken into consideration. Therefore,
there is no guideline by which management can be guaranteed
success.
Success in business is an attitude. It is the attitude
which management attacks operations of the business. If each
new venture is attacked with the attitude to succeed, all
means necessary in achieving success will be utilized. Manage¬
ment will draw on many fields to supplement and facilitate its
task. It will keep its objective in mind and its plans will
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be centered around achieving this objective.
Often there exist the desire to succeed but not the
ability. If the attitude to succeed exist, the desire to
succeed will provoke management to seek to acquire the neces¬
sary skills to have the ability to succeed. The desire to
succeed will necessarily involve tn understanding of the fac¬
tors which may contribute to failure. To achieve the objective
of success at a profit management will be constantly reviewing
its financial position to detect any signs of deterioration.
This attitude can assist the incompetent manager in becoming
a very competent one.
APPENDIX
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ANALYSIS OP FINANCIAL STATEMENTSI,The Equities (Is the company "Trading on the equity"
excessively?)
1. Has the structural ratio (N« W. to Liab) declined
significantly (205^) in the last four years?
2« What has caused the change in the structural ratio?
(Trend ratios)
3* Has the capitalization of the company decreased
significantly (10^) during the last four years?
(Stock and Capital Surplus)
14.. Has the co^any's earned surplus Increased signifi¬
cantly (20^ in the last four years?
Is the structural ratio below the level that appears
normal for this company?
6, Conclusion regarding the equities;II.Non-current Assets (Is the couipany over expanded in non-
current assets?)
1, Has the structural ratio (N, W, to Non-current as¬
sets) declined significantly {20%) in the last
four years?
2, What has caused the change in the structural ratio?
(Trend ratios)
3* Have the non-current assets of the company increased
significantly (20^) during the last four years?
l|.. Is the structural ratio below the level that appears
normal for this company?
5. Conclusion regarding the non-current assets:III.Working Capital (Does the coiepany have adequate working
capital?)
1. How many calendar days are required to turnover the




2, How many days sales are "tied up" in receivables?
360 divided by structural ratio, (Sales to Re¬
ceivables)
3* What is the rate of turnover of current assets
(in days)?
I4., What is the usual credit term in the industry
(in days)?
5* What is the minimum Current Ratio?
6, Is t he present Current Ratio below this minimum?
7, Is the Acid Test ratio below of the minimum
Current Ratio?
8, Is the company attempting to do a larger volume
of sales per dollar of working capital?
(working capital turnover also trend ratios)
9* Is the company borrowing funds to carry the inven¬
tory? (Either voluntary or involuntary credit)
10, Conclusion regarding working capital:
IV, Inventory (Is the company speculating in inventory or
appears not to have control over its inven¬
tory :)
1, What is the inventory turnover of the subject company?
2, What is the inventory turnover of other companies in
the industry?
3, Does the industry have a higher inventory turnover?
i}.. Has the inventory turnover declined significantly
(10^) in the last four years?
5, Has the commodity volume of sales declined signifi¬
cantly (5^) in the last three years?
6, Has the commodity volume Inventory increased signifi¬
cantly in the last three years?
7, Has the company maintained its ^ mark-up during the
last four years?
8, Conclusion regarding inventory:
59V,Receivables {Is the con^any properly controlling its
Receivables?)
1. Has the structural ratio (Sales to Receivables)
declined significantly (10^) in the last three
years?
2. What has caused the change in the structural ratio?
(Trend ratios)
3. Has the company lost commodity volume of sales
during the last two years?
l\.. Has the company been more liberal in extending credit
or collecting accounts? (aging account?)
5. Have economic conditions as related to collecting
accounts been favorable during the last two years?
6. Conclusions regarding receivables:VI,Net Profit (Has the past operating experiences of the
con5)any been satisfacoory?)
1, Has the commodity volume of sales increased during
the last three years?
2, Has the company maintained its percentage of mark-up
during the last four years?
3, Has the company been able to control operating ex¬
penses (in relationship to sales)?
i|.. Is the cuirrent (two years) operating profit below
normal for the company?
5. Is the current (two years) net profit below normal
for the coii5>any?
6, Conclusion regarding operating experience:VII.Sundry Information
1, What has been the percentage of average earnings on
current market price ( years)
2, What has been the percentage of average dividends
on current market price ( years)
3« What percentage of earnings have been declared as
dividends under present management?
i;. Does the current market price exceed the current
book value?
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5* Does the current market price exceed ten times average
earnings (under present management?)
6, Has the present management operated the company
through a period of depression years?
BIBLIOGRAPHT
Books
Bogen, Jules I. Financial Handbook. 3rd ed. New York:
The Ronald Press, 1953*
Bonneville, Joseph H,, Dewey, Lloyd E, and Kelly, Harry M.
Organizing and Financing Business. 6th ed. Englewood
Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I960.
Broom, H. M. and Longnecker, J. 0. Small Business Manage-
ment. Clnnlnnatl: South Western Publishing Co., 1961.
Cohen, J. B. and Robbins, S. M. The Financial Manager. New
York: Harper Row, 1966,
Davis, Carlisle R. and Gee, Edward T. American Institute of
Banking. Analyzing Financial Statements. New York:
American Institute of Banking, 1961^..
Dewing, Arthur S, The Financial Policy of Corporations.
Vols. I & II, New York: The Ronald Press co., 195'3*
Donaldson, Edwin T, and Pfahl, John R. Corporate Finance.
2nd ed. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1963.
Donaldson, Gordon, Hunt, Pearson, and Williams, Charles M.
Basic Business Finance. 2nd ed. Homewood Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 196l,
Donaldson, Gordon, Hunt, Pearson, and Williams, Charles M.
Basle Business Finance. 3rd ed. Homewood Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966.
Dougall, Hubert E. and Guthmann, Harry T. Corporate Finan¬
cial Mamgement. 2nd ed. New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 191|.6.
Fitzpatrick, Paul J. Symptoms of Industrial Failures.
Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of
America, 1931*
Gerstenberg, Charles W. Financial Organization and Manage¬
ment of Business, l^th ed. rev.; Englewood Cliffs,
Hew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19d0.
61
62
Graduate School of Business Administration, George F* Baker
Foundation Harvard University, Harvard Business Reports.
Vols. V, VI & VII j New York: A7 W. Shaw, 1926.
Husband, William H* and Dockeray, James C, Modern Corpora¬
tion Finance. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1957.
Key Business Ratios In 125 Lines - 1963. New York: Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 1963.
Longstreet, James R. Cases In Financial Management. San
Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1961.
Monthly Failures. New York: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 1966.
Ifyer, John N. Financial Statement Analysis. 3rd ed. Engle¬
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961,
Osborn, Richard C, Business Finance. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1965.
Sloan, Alfred P,, Jr. My Years With General Motors, ed,
John McDonald and Catharine Stevens. New Yrok: Mac-
Fadden-Bartel Corp,, 1965.
Taylor, W. Bayard, Financial Policies of Business Enter-
prlses. 2nd ed,; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1956.
The Failure Record Through 1961i.. New York: Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 1965.
Articles and Periodicals
Aldekman, Samuel. ”To the Brink and Back,” Credit and Finan¬
cial Management. (August 19614.), 3l4.-3o*
Starkweather, Louis P. "Why Business Failure," Credit and
Financial Management (May I9I4J.), 20-30.
"The End of the Affair," The Economist (August 19614.), 8l4.7"i4-8.
Wyant, Rowena. "Least Likely to Secceed," Dun*8 Review and
Modern Industry. LXX (November, 1937)* 31-33*
63
Government Publications
Sadd, Victor and Williams, Robert T, Causes of Commerlcal
Bankruptcies. Domestic Coimnerce Series, No, 69. WasKlng-
ton, D. C,: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1932,
Small Business Administration, Management Research Summary.
MRS-197: l-61j.J MRS-102: 1-63; MRS-10^: 1-63; MRS-58;
MRS - 63.
